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EXTERNALITIES EVERYWHERE?:
MORALS AND THE POLICE POWER
ICARD A- EPSTEIN*
Within the academy, it is possible to enter into two kinds of
debate about the scope of economic, social, and moral
regulation. One type of debate takes place across schools,
between individuals who do not share any obvious common
premises about how the world is or about how it ought to be.
The second type of debate takes place within schools, where the
disputants start from some common premises but differ on how
these should be interpreted or applied.
In debates across schools, the struggle is usually over some
fundamental methodological or normative assumption, the
participants having such radically different views that they find it
difficult to talk to one another. The debates over the proper
domain of law and economics, especially those which ask how
economics can deal with empathy, offer one illustration of that
kind of sharp confrontation.
The disagreements between Eric Rasmusen and myself are not
over fundamental world views.! Our disagreements are less a
battle and more a dialogue, one which takes place within a
framework which we both find comfortable and which has been
applied to a wide panoply of economic and social regulation.
This ecumenical note is not to say that we do not disagree. In
Rasmusen's hands, law and economics is said to lend itself to a
rather broad range of governmental regulation of what he
sometimes calls "mental externalities."2 He deals with a wide
range of social legislation that, at one time, was called "morals"
regulation under the police power of the state. The precise
scope of morals regulation was always important to determine,
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1. See Eric Rasmusen, Of Sex and Drug, and Rock'n'Roll: Does Law and Economics Support
Social Reguation?, 21 HARv.J.L. & PuB. PoLY 71 (1997).
2. See id. at 75. See generally RIcHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 23-24 (1995)
(arguing against taking mental externalities into account because of the illiberal
implications).
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for even in the so-called nineteenth-century heyday of laissez-
faire, the legislature had unquestioned power to regulate on
what were deemed to be morals questions
My first task, therefore, is to explain something about the
general framework of regulation and then to show my
reservations about Rasmusen's approach to these questions. The
starting point for all theories of regulation is, in my view, not law
but human biology. Given the forces of evolution, we should
start with the assumption that all individuals are governed by a
substantial dose of self-interest, which, if not properly directed,
can result in socially destructive behavior. The trick of sound
social design is to harness individual self-interest to socially-
productive activities.
With this in mind, some points, at least, are relatively non-
controversial. Generally speaking, most of us are content to
accept a prohibition against the use of force. Indeed, the mutual
renunciation of the use of force lies at the center of all
important theories of social contract. The list can, I think, be
extended. Most of us want to enforce most promises most of the
time. We are uneasy about the use of monopoly power,
especially when it is supported by the force of law. And,
generally speaking, most of us recognize that private contracts
between two individuals can easily have adverse consequences
on third parties. A full and accurate account of the various
doctrines of private property and private contract would
therefore require us to go through a fairly systematic inquiry
about the dangers that flow from various social arrangements.
What are the costs of exclusion, of making various resources
private? What are the costs of coordination, of making them
public? And how should these be compared as we move from
one resource to another?
One constant theme in any analysis of private property and
ordinary contract centers on this theme of externalities. It makes
sense to prohibit certain kinds of contractual arrangements
when their external costs exceed their private gains. The
antitrust concern with price fixing gains its force precisely
because there is a strong economic theory that suggests that the
3. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); ERNST FREUND, THE POLIcE
POWER. PuBucPOUCYrAND CONSTITUTIONAL RIHTS (1904); Samuel Williston, Fredom of
Contract 6 CORNELL LQ. 365, 375-76 (1921) (noting that police powers are permissible
to promote "safety, health, morals and the general welfare of the public").
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revenue gains to the collusive sellers are systematically smaller
than the losses that are sustained by the potential buyers who
are faced with these arrangements Simply to point out that
these externalities exist, however, is not to demonstrate that they
always exceed the private gains to the parties-or even that the
costs of preventing the external harms is smaller than the harms
themselves. Once we are aware of the contingentjudgments that
are required in a broad range of social contexts, we should be
on guard against becoming too shrill in our defense of laissez-
faire. Broad propositions are not the same as necessary truths,
and wise general principles often admit important exceptions.
To be sure, the final reckoning of any system should find a
broad role for private contracts and private property! The
methodology for reaching that result is more cumbersome and
less deductive than we might wish. A simple assertion of natural
rights to property and contract will not carry the day on grounds
of self-evidence alone. We should prefer a position that is
nonobvious but correct to one that is self-evident but wrong.
Now that this general framework has been sketched, how does
it apply to the general class of morals regulation to which
Rasmusen has directed his remarks? It is at this juncture that my
more cautious lawyer's instincts overtake my more programmatic
philosophical concerns. Here the first difficulty is .simply the
familiar question of how we decide what counts as a "social"-as
opposed to an "economic--regulation, to use his terms,6 or
what counts as a regulation that falls within the morals heading
of the police power. The means of phrasing this question is not
without significance. The morals heading of the police power
could cover prostitution, blasphemy, gambling, adultery, and the
like. Whatever its reach, it is surely somewhat narrower than the
category of "social' regulation to which Rasmusen refers.7
But beware that once we decide that negative externalities
justify regulation in the social context when they might not
justify them in the economic context, we should expect
4. Se; g., ROBERTH. BORM, THEANITRuSTPARADOX (1978).
5. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE PONWER OF
EMINENTDOMAIN (1985).
6. SaRasmusen, supranote 1, at7l.
7. In Rasmusen's usage, "social regulation" seemingly includes any sort of regulation
of conduct based on a rejection of the premise that "each person's conduct is his own
affair." Id. at 71.
No. 1]
HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy ,
regulators to shift the border between these two spheres so that
the economic regulation of the past generation becomes the
social regulation of today. Any legislator who reads Rasmusen
will be sure to insert into his favorite statute the appropriate
preamble so that it becomes a form of social regulation entitled
to general respect and judicial deference. The legislator will tilt
his statute to enlarge the scope of governmental power.
Nor should we suppose that this enterprise is particularly
difficult to undertake. Consider the family-leave statutes that
have been enacted on both the federal and state levels.8 As a
matter of first principle, I cannot think of any legislation less
meritorious than these laws, no matter the cubby hole in which
they are placed. There is no social justification for disrupting
private contractual arrangements over the question of which
circumstances generate leave, with or without pay, and which do
not. It may be good that people are given leave without pay after
the birth of a new child or to take care of a seriously ill family
member. And certainly, I do not wish to be heard as banning
these practices or encouraging employers to deny a request for
leave.
Yet, no matter how the issue is classified, there is no reason
why any decision over leave should not be made consensually by
the parties instead of coercively by the state. The question in all
cases is whether the gain to the employee from getting the leave
is greater than the costs it imposes on the employer-costs that
are measured by the need to shuffle the remaining workforce, to
hire a temporary worker who requires training, or to forego
some critical selling or developmental opportunity. There is no
way in the abstract to be so confident that the relative costs
always cut one way so that the leave can be ordered as a matter
of right. The issue is one that could be negotiated up-front as
part of the basic contract or negotiated on-the-spot at the
pleasure of the parties. Additionally, letting an employer note
that he can refuse to tolerate a particular leave could send an
important signal, allowing workers to sort themselves out in
terms of their likelihood of wanting to take leave for pressing
family reasons. What the statutes do, however, is to leave
8. Se4 eg., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (1994)
(guaranteeing up to twelve weeks annual leave for family emergencies to employees of
companies with fifty or more employees).
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employers without protection from flight attendants who wish to
take their family leave at the height of the travel season or from
accountants who need to take leave between March 1 and April
15. Just figuring out what it means to have leave without pay,
when work is bunched in one season and pay is spread out
evenly over the calendar year, should be enough to make us
cautious about intervention. Finally, saying that this legislation is
social rather than economic-when it is so obviously both-
hardly advances the argument.
The same logic applies to an even more intrusive regulation of
employment markets, the antidiscrimination laws9. These laws,
as applied to private firms in competitive industries, are often
justified as a form of social regulation with strong and desirable
symbolic effects. 'o I might well agree that they have symbolic
effects. It hardly follows that all effects are positive or that, even
to the extent they are positive, they outweigh the economic
dislocations that come in the wake of the antidiscrimination laws
(dislocations caused by the inability to make hiring decisions
that do not have to be justified to the EEOC, a federaljury, or a
trial judge)." It may, for' example, be said that the
antidiscrimination laws give hope to the excluded and marginal
individuals who have not had full rights of participation in
society.'2 As such, these laws sound as though they embrace a set
of laudable symbols. Perhaps they do, but perhaps the symbols
embraced are not confined to those just mentioned. There is
another, equally obvious, reading of antidiscrimination laws.
This reading says that the only reason we adopt statutes of this
sort is because we do not think that individuals in certain groups
can make it on their own and need the assistance of the state at
every stage of their careers. As such, antidiscrimination laws
condemn such persons to a second-class citizenship
characterized by a complete lack of self-reliance and
9. Se, ag., Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994)
(prohibiting age discrimination against individuals over age forty); Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (proscribing discrimination because of race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin); Americans With Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
213 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination against individuals with physical or mental
disabilities).
10. Cf. PATICIAJ. WILLIAMS, THEALCHEMY OF RACEAND RIGHTS 4-49 (1991).
11. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 2058 (1992) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS].
12. Cf. WIaLAMs, supra note 10, at 44-49.
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self-sufficiency. Symbolic arguments can cut both ways. How one
sorts these arguments ought to be a matter for spirited debate,
but this debate is not tipped in one direction or the other by our
choice of whether to call antidiscrimination laws "social" or
"economic" regulation.
The necessary task is to take into account all the economic
effects and all the symbolic effects and total them. Here, the
economic effects of the antidiscrimination statutes are negative.
They embody high administrative costs and disrupt private
contractual behavior. So, the burden is on those who defend the
legislation to show that the negative external effects that occur
without such legislation dominate the positive ones.
There is today a dangerous tendency to assume that the
simple mention of a negative externality is sufficient to
overwhelm the very large economic disruptions. For some
reason, this entire area invites people to make two very large
leaps. From the observation that symbols matter, it is falsely
assumed that they all cut in one direction. Then, following the
observation that in a particular case the symbolic effects are
negative, it becomes too easy to forget that both symbolic and
economic costs are in play simultaneously. This truncated vision
is a very bad way to look at the world.
In contrast, I would start at the other extreme by assuming
that the symbolic effects of government regulation are generally
negative. The logic of competition is extraordinarily powerful
when there are many players on both sides of the market. The
ability to compete successfully in markets carries with it many
positive symbolic effects. It also encourages the habits of
reliability, thrift, imagination, and integrity, which should be
praised on moral grounds both in business and in ordinary
social relations. From my point of view, the symbolic
externalities associated with the advancement of private market
behavior are generally positive.'
If this analysis is correct, it offers strong instruction as to how
we should proceed. In principle, when brokering the difference
between these various kinds of externalities, we have to ask
whether we should examine "the business" on a wholesale or
retail basis. The wholesale basis requires that we consider the
full range of external effects at one sitting. They are all in one
13. SeeEPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 11, at 28-58.
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large bucket, and our only question is to decide whether we
want to keep that bucket full or empty. And, with symbolic
externalities, I think that the proper approach is to cordon them
off in all cases and ignore them. It is not that we do not take
these consequences and effects into account in our ordinary
lives. Indeed, they are typically the stuff of social interactions. It
is one thing, however, to take them into account in setting social
sanctions and quite another to incorporate them into legal
policy.
One reason to be very cautious about basing regulation on
social externalities stems from how these regulations are likely to
be incorporated into the legal system. Laws are made by politics,
and often a political coalition can enact its particular
preferences into law solely by appealing to the intensity of its
preferences. Once the law is passed, the nation speaks with a
single voice that generates a powerful engine that can be
brought to bear on the dissenters who thought that the original
policy was misguided. The various extensions of the
antidiscrimination law to disabilities14 and age'5 certainly show
the cohesive power of that form of political rhetoric.
By leaving these symbolic effects to the social arena, we no
longer get- the "all or nothing" effect. Shifts in individual
sentiment can be aggregated continuously over time. As the
sentiment against various forms of discrimination grows, as it has
grown, the social disapproval of certain practices increases. The
cost to those who practice these forms of behavior will increase
as individual consumers simply direct their business, without
fanfare or celebration, elsewhere. As the social sentiment starts
to shift, the social frequency of practices will shift as well. But we
shall never have the unfortunate situation that occurs as a result
of regulation, whereby a shift in public sentiment from 53% to
47% one way to 53% to 47% the other works a complete reversal
of legal consequences from 0 to 100.
It is true that the entire system of checks and balances is
designed to moderate these effects within the world of
legislation, so the contrast that I am making is somewhat
overdrawn. But, even after due allowance is made for these
structured complexities, political reversals are more
14. SeeAmericans With Disabilities Act, supra note 9.
15. SeeAge Discrimination in Employment Act, supra note 9.
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discontinuous than changes in social practices. Before we decide
that social sanctions are insufficient, we should ponder the
wisdom and danger of using old-fashioned state-based coercion
to counter soft externalities. So long as people do not threaten
your bodily integrity or obtain a stranglehold over critical goods
and services, we are well advised to let decentralized social
sanctions deal with these soft social issues.
Once that basic position is staked out, proponents of the legal
regulation of social behavior face a strong uphill battle. It is fair
to ask whether there are any sensible exceptions to this
operating presumption. Here it may help to shy away from
Rasmusen's broader term "social regulation" 6 and to instead use
the more limited term "morals regulation"-the latter being
used as it is in the traditional phrase recognizing the police
power of the state in matters of "safety, health, morals and the
general welfare."17 Because this last term, "general welfare," is
notoriously mischievous, I shall leave it aside for the moment
and concentrate on the morals heading of the police power.
To figure out why that heading was so important traditionally,
it is useful to think of the state of social and scientific knowledge
in the United States during the critical ante-bellum period, from
approximately 1820 to 1860. Recall that this was a time before
anyone knew that bacteria were microscopic agents capable of
propagating disease. In a world in which medical knowledge had
but a weak toehold over our imagination, moralisms played a
very large role in individual and social protection. Maxims like
"cleanliness is next to Godliness" probably saved more lives than
the rudimentary forms of public sanitation that were available
during this period.
Knowledge changes attitudes towards the dominant legal
categories. Once it becomes clear that the state now has the
resources to attack some of these issues, what they called moral
legislation is probably better understood as an imperfect and
indirect form of safety or health regulation that could easily be
justified on other grounds a century later. So, regulation on
public waste and of sexual contact could easily be
conceptualized as morals regulation-when in fact it was aimed
at the transmission of deadly diseases. Once the mechanism of
16. Rasmusen, supranote 1, at 71.
17. wVlliston, supra note 3, at 375-76.
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infection is better understood, the nature of the regulation can
be more focused on the dangers in question, and justifications
are likely to shift from morals to health and safety. It is perhaps
in this form that we would put regulation designed to close bath
houses or to regulate prostitution. Note that as we let our moral
guard down in the Twentieth Century, AIDS is to us what
syphilis was a century ago. Some sort of legal regulation of
sexual behavior, then, is perhaps in order, although it does not
matter whether we call this morals or health regulation.
It should be possible to repeat this kind of demonstration for
some of the traditional types of social regulation. Certainly the
recent study of gambling suggests that it has powerful negative
economic consequences that are not borne by the communities
that sponsor these activities and that in turn surely account for
much of the huge resistance to gambling that has surfaced in
recent years.8 So, I suspect that there is some very narrow
category of cases for which Rasmusen's general concerns are
correct, but if so, they must be defined far more narrowly than
he has done in his general presentation. At this point, there is a
wonderful, if improbable, congruence between modem social
and classical constitutional theory. This approach does not
begin to touch the ordinary commercial arrangements, the so-
called "labor" statutes, which were prohibited during the heyday
of economic liberties.'9 It does explain, perhaps, why the same
judges that were suspicious of mandatory unions and minimum
wage laws took a more deferential view to regulation in the area
of morals before the rise of the New Deal when the categories
reversed. Today intimate forms of personal association are
frequently protected from legislative intervention, while
ordinary forms of economic activity are routinely subject to
direct and powerful regulation. What an odd inversion of
constitutional theory indeed.
18. See ROBERT GOODMAN, LEGALIZED GAMBLING AS A STRATEGY FOR F-CONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (1994);John W. Kindtr U.S. National Security and t*p State kiconomk Base
The BufnesslEconomic Impacts of the Legalization of Gambling Activities, 89 Sr. Louis U. L.J.
567 (1995).
19. See Lochne, supra note 3; Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908) (where
Justice Harlan switched sides to protect "yellowdog" contracts once the health issues
raised in Lodhnerwere no longer plausible); see also Coppage v. Kansas, 286 U.S. 1 (1915)
(invalidating similar state laws).
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